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Efforts to improve the reproducibility and integrity of science are typically justified by a narrative of crisis,
according to which most published results are unreliable due to growing problems with research and
publication practices. This article provides an overview of recent evidence suggesting that this narrative is
mistaken, and argues that a narrative of epochal changes and empowerment of scientists would be more
accurate, inspiring, and compelling.
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Is there a reproducibility crisis in science? Many seem
to believe so. In a recent survey by the journal Nature,
for example, around 90% of respondents agreed that
there is a “slight” or “significant” crisis, and between
40% and 70% agreed that selective reporting, fraud,
and pressures to publish “always” or “often” contrib-
ute to irreproducible research (1). Results of this non-
randomized survey may not accurately represent the
population of practicing scientists, but they echo
beliefs expressed by a rapidly growing scientific
literature, which uncritically endorses a new “crisis
narrative” about science (an illustrative sample of this
literature is shown in Fig. 1 and listed in Dataset S1).
Put simply, this new “science in crisis” narrative
postulates that a large and growing proportion of
studies published across disciplines are unreliable
due to the declining quality and integrity of research
and publication practices, largely because of growing
pressures to publish and other ills affecting the con-
temporary scientific profession.
I argue that this crisis narrative is at least partially
misguided. Recent evidence from metaresearch stud-
ies suggests that issues with research integrity and
reproducibility, while certainly important phenomena
that need to be addressed, are: (i) not distorting the
majority of the literature, in science as a whole as well
as within any given discipline; (ii) heterogeneously dis-
tributed across subfields in any given area, which
suggests that generalizations are unjustified; and (iii) not
growing, as the crisis narrative would presuppose. Alter-
native narratives, therefore,might represent a better fit for
empirical data as well as for the reproducibility agenda.
How Common Are Fabricated, False, Biased,
and Irreproducible Findings?
Scientific misconduct and questionable research
practices (QRP) occur at frequencies that, while
nonnegligible, are relatively small and therefore
unlikely to have a major impact on the literature. In
anonymous surveys, on average 1–2% of scientists
admit to having fabricated or falsified data at least
once (2). Much higher percentages admit to other
QRP, such as dropping data points based on a gut
feeling or failing to publish a contradictory result.
However, the percentage of scientific literature that
is actually affected by these practices is unknown,
and evidence suggests that it is likely to be smaller,
at least five times smaller according to a survey
among psychologists (3). Data that directly estimate
the prevalence of misconduct are scarce but appear
to corroborate this conclusion. Random laboratory
audits in cancer clinical trials, for example, found
that only 0.28% contained “scientific improprieties”
(4), and those conducted among Food and Drug
Administration clinical trials between 1977 and 1988
found problems sufficient to initiate “for cause”
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investigations only in 4% of cases (5). Visual inspections
of microbiology papers suggested that between 1%
and 2% of papers had been manipulated in ways that
suggested intentional fabrication (6, 7).
The occurrence of questionable or flawed research
and publication practices may be revealed by a high
rate of false-positives and “P-hacked” (8) results.
However, while these issues do appear to be more
common than outright scientific misconduct, their
impact on the reliability of the literature appears to be
contained. Analyses based on the distribution of P
values reported in the medical literature, for example,
suggested a false-discovery rate of only 14% (9). A
similar but broader analysis concluded that P-hacking
was common in many disciplines and yet had minor
effects in distorting conclusions of meta-analyses (10).
Moreover, the same analysis found a much stronger
“evidential value” in the literature of all disciplines,
which suggests that the majority of published studies
are measuring true effects, a finding that again con-
tradicts the belief that most published findings are
false-positives. Methodological criticisms suggest that
these and similar studies may be underestimating the
true impact of P-hacking (11, 12). However, to the best
of my knowledge, there is no alternative analysis that
suggests that P-hacking is severely distorting the
scientific literature.
Low statistical power might increase the risk of
false-positives (as well as false-negatives). In several
disciplines, the average statistical power of studies
was found to be significantly below the recommended
80% level (13–16). However, such studies showed that
power varies widely between subfields or methodol-
ogies, which should warn against making simplistic
generalizations to entire disciplines (13–16). Moreover,
the extent to which low power generates false-positives
depends on assumptions about the magnitude of the
true underlying effect size, level of research bias,
and prior probabilities that the tested hypothesis is
in fact correct (17). These assumptions, just like
statistical power itself, are likely to vary substantially
across subfields and are very difficult to measure in
practice. For most published research findings to be
false in psychology and neuroscience, for example,
one must assume that the hypotheses tested in
these disciplines are correct much less than 50% of
the time (14, 18). This assumption is, in my opinion,
unrealistic. It might reflect the condition of early
exploratory studies that are conducted in a theo-
retical and empirical vacuum, but not that of most
ordinary research, which builds upon previous the-
ory and evidence and therefore aims at relatively
predictable findings.
It may be counter-argued that the background lit-
erature that produces theory and evidence on which
new studies are based is distorted by publication and
other reporting biases. However, the extent to which
this is the case is, again, likely to vary by research
subfield. Indeed, in a meta-assessment of bias across
all disciplines, small-study effects and gray-literature
bias (both possible symptoms of reporting biases)
were highly heterogeneously distributed (19). This
finding was consistent with evidence that studies on
publication bias may themselves be subject to a
publication bias (20), which entails that fields that do
not suffer from bias are underrepresented in the
metaresearch literature.
The case that most publications are nonreproducible
would be supported by meta-meta-analyses, if these
had shown that on average there is a strong “decline
effect,” in which initially strong “promising” results are
contradicted by later studies. While a decline effect
was measurable across many meta-analyses, it is far
from ubiquitous (19). This suggests that in many meta-
analyses, initial findings are refuted, whereas in others
they are confirmed. Isn’t this what should happen when
science is functional?
Ultimately, the debate over the existence of a re-
producibility crisis should have been closed by recent
large-scale assessments of reproducibility. Their re-
sults, however, are either reassuring or inconclusive. A
“Many labs” project reported that 10 of 13 studies
taken from the psychological literature had been
consistently replicated multiple times across different
settings (21), whereas an analysis in experimental
economics suggested that, of 18 studies, at least
11 had been successfully replicated (22). The largest
reproducibility initiative to date suggested that in
psychological science, reproducibility was below 50%
(23). This latter estimate, however, is likely to be too
pessimistic for at least two reasons. First because,
once again, such a low level of reproducibility was not
ubiquitous but varied depending on subfield, meth-
odology, and expertise of the authors conducting the
replication (23–25). Second, and more importantly,
because how reproducibility ought to be measured is
the subject of a growing methodological and philo-
sophical debate, and reanalyses of the data suggest
that reproducibility in psychological science might
Fig. 1. Number ofWeb of Science records that in the title, abstract, or keywords
contain one of the following phrases: “reproducibility crisis,” “scientific crisis,”
“science in crisis,” “crisis in science,” “replication crisis,” “replicability crisis.”
Records were classified by the author according to whether, based on title and
abstracts, they implicitly or explicitly endorsed the crisis narrative described in the
text (red), or alternatively questioned the existence of such a crisis (blue), or
discussed “scientific crises” of other kinds or could not be classified due to
insufficient information (gray). The complete dataset, which includes all titles and
abstracts and dates back to the year 1933, is available in Dataset S1. This sample
is merely illustrative, and does not include the numerous recent research
articles and opinion articles that discuss the “science is in crisis” narrative without
including any of the above sentences in the title, abstract, or keywords.
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be higher than originally claimed (23, 26, 27). Indeed,
the very notion of “reproducible research” can be
confusing, because its meaning and implications de-
pend on what aspect of research is being examined:
the reproducibility of research methods can in princi-
ple be expected to be 100%; but the reproducibility of
results and inferences is likely to be lower and to vary
across subfields and methodologies, for reasons that
have nothing to do with questionable research and
publication practices (28).
Are These Problems Getting Worse?
In light of multiple recent studies, there is no evidence
that scientific misconduct and QRPs have increased.
The number of yearly findings of scientific misconduct
by the US Office of Research Integrity (ORI) has not
increased, nor has the proportion, of all ORI investi-
gations, that resulted in a finding of misconduct (29).
Retractions have risen sharply in absolute terms, but
the number of retractions per retracting journals has
not, suggesting that the trend is due to the diffusion
and improvement of journal retraction policies and
practices (29). Errata and corrections have also not
increased, nor has the rate of statistical errors made in
mainstream psychological journals (29, 30).
The questionable practice known as “salami-slic-
ing,” in which results are fractionalized to increase
publication output, is widely believed to be on the
rise. However, there is no evidence that scientists are
publishing more papers today than in the 1950s, once
coauthorship is adjusted for (31). Indeed, assessments
in various disciplines suggest that, far from becoming
increasingly short and trivial, published studies are
getting longer, more complex, and richer in data (e.g.,
refs. 32–34).
Biases in research and reporting were suggested
to be on the rise by multiple independent studies,
which had found that the relative proportion of
“positive” and “statistically significant” results re-
ported in article abstracts has increased over the
years (35–37). However, the aforementioned evi-
dence that papers in many (and maybe most) dis-
ciplines are becoming longer and more complex
suggests that negative results may not be disap-
pearing from the literature, as originally suggested,
but perhaps only from abstracts. Negative results,
in other words, may be increasingly embedded in
longer publications that contain multiple results, and
they therefore remain accessible to any researcher
interested in finding them.
Finally, pressures to publish have not been con-
vincingly linked to evidence of bias or misconduct.
Earlier studies that compared the scientific pro-
ductivity of countries offered some support for such a
link (38, 39). However, later, finer-grained analyses
offered contrary evidence, by showing that re-
searchers that publish at higher frequency, in journals
with higher impact factor, and in countries where
pressures to publish are high, are equally or more
likely to correct their work, less likely to publish papers
that are retracted, less likely to author papers that
contain duplicated images, and less likely to author
papers reporting overestimated effects (19, 40, 41).
The risk of misconduct and QRPs appears to be higher
among researchers in countries that are increasingly
represented in the global scientific literature, like
China or India (7, 40). Global demographic changes,
therefore, might contribute to a rise in the proportion
of papers affected by scientific misconduct, but such a
trend would have little to do with rising pressures to
publish in Western countries.
DoWe Need the “Science in Crisis”Narrative to
Promote Better Science?
To summarize, an expanding metaresearch literature
suggests that science—while undoubtedly facing old
and new challenges—cannot be said to be un-
dergoing a “reproducibility crisis,” at least not in the
sense that it is no longer reliable due to a pervasive
and growing problem with findings that are fabri-
cated, falsified, biased, underpowered, selected, and
irreproducible. While these problems certainly exist
and need to be tackled, evidence does not suggest
that they undermine the scientific enterprise as a
whole. Science always was and always will be a
struggle to produce knowledge for the benefit of all of
humanity against the cognitive and moral limitations
of individual human beings, including the limitations
of scientists themselves.
The new “science is in crisis” narrative is not only
empirically unsupported, but also quite obviously
counterproductive. Instead of inspiring younger gen-
erations to do more and better science, it might foster
in them cynicism and indifference. Instead of inviting
greater respect for and investment in research, it risks
discrediting the value of evidence and feeding
antiscientific agendas.
Furthermore, this narrative is not actually new.
Complaints about a decline in the quality of research
recur throughout the history of science, right from its
beginnings (42, 43). Only two elements of novelty
characterize the current “crisis.” The first is that the
validity of these concerns is being assessed scientifi-
cally by a global metaresearch program, with results
that have been briefly overviewed above (44). The
second element of historical novelty is the rising
power of information and communication technolo-
gies, which are transforming scientific practices in all
fields, just as they are transforming all other aspects of
human life. These technologies promise to make re-
search more accurate, powerful, open, democratic,
transparent, and self-correcting than ever before. At
the same time, this technological revolution creates
new expectations and new challenges that meta-
researchers are striving to address.
Therefore, contemporary science could be more
accurately portrayed as facing “new opportuni-
ties and challenges” or even a “revolution” (45).
Efforts to promote transparency and reproducibil-
ity would find complete justification in such a narra-
tive of transformation and empowerment, a narrative
that is not only more compelling and inspiring
than that of a crisis, but also better supported by
evidence.
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